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We examine the presence of the Ramadan effect in feedback trading drawing on a sample of 
eleven majority Muslim markets for the period of 29/6/2001 to 1/8/2016. Feedback trading is 
significant in several of these markets, appearing stronger outside, rather than within, 
Ramadan. These results hold for the full sample period, including before and after the global 
financial crisis raising the possibility that Ramadan’s widely documented lower volatility is 
related to the reduced presence of feedback trading during that month. We attribute our findings 
to Ramadan’s traditionally documented low volumes rendering feedback trading less feasible 
during that month.  










The role of religion in investors’ behaviour has to date been investigated for a wide cross 
section of investment decisions, including saving (Guiso et al., 2003; Keister, 2003; Renneboog 
and Spaenjers, 2012), equity investing (Kumar, 2009; Kumar et al., 2011; Louche et al., 2012; 
Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012), herding (Gavriilidis et al., 2016) and risk taking (Kumar, 
2009; Dohmen et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2011; Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012; Noussair et 
al., 2013).In the above context, this study investigates for the first time the effect of religion 
over feedback trading, by exploring whether the latter is subject to the well-documented 
Ramadan effect (Białkowski et al., 2012). Feedback trading is a behavioural investment pattern 
with established popularity among investors internationally (Choi and Skiba, 2015) and the 
rationale underlying the study of its relationship with the Ramadan effect in this paper is that 
the month of Ramadan has been found to affect factors (social mood; volatility) that have been 
shown to interact significantly with feedback trading. Our study addresses this issue in the 
context of eleven majority Muslim markets, by first assessing whether they accommodate 
significant feedback trading and whether the latter manifests itself asymmetrically contingent 
on market performance. Second, we examine whether the presence of feedback trading in these 
markets varies within, compared to outside, Ramadan, in view of the growing literature on the 
Ramadan effect in stock exchanges of majority Muslim countries. Third, we investigate 
whether the presence of the Ramadan effect in these markets’ feedback trading varies before 
and after the recent global financial crisis. 
From a theoretical perspective, feedback trading refers to the universe of strategies relying on 
the identification of patterns in historical data, the latter mainly (but not exclusively) pertaining 
to price-series. 1 Key to feedback trading is the notion that prices exhibit inertia in their 
 
1Technical analysis, perhaps the best-known facet of feedback trading practice, includes strategies often based on 
the combination of prices with other aggregate gauges, such as volume (Lo et al., 2000). 
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formation by generating trends over time (Farmer, 2002) and, as such, runs counter to the weak 
form of market efficiency (Fama, 1991). This is both because it views prices as entailing 
predictability in their structure (it is based on pattern recognition in price trends) and because 
it enhances it (trading on price trends can amplify serial correlation in the returns’ structure; 
Cutler et al., 1990). Depending on the direction of its response to price trends, feedback trading 
can be positive (the case when investors choose to track a trend) or negative (the case of 
investors choosing to trade against a trend) and can be driven by a variety of factors. On many 
occasions, investors opt to feedback trade as a means of mitigating some risk or uncertainty in 
their environment. Feedback trading, for example, is often employed as a response to 
information risk when the past price sequences of stocks for which information is hard to either 
access or process are viewed as informative enough; this is the case, for instance, when trading 
small capitalization stocks (their publicly available information is scarce due to limited 
analysts’ following) 2  and foreign stocks (foreign investors may view themselves at an 
informational disadvantage when trading overseas).3Widely employed strategies, including 
portfolio insurance (Kodres, 1994), margin trading (Sentana and Wadhwani, 1992; Watanabe, 
2002; Hirose et al., 2009) and stop loss orders (Osler, 2005), which are triggered as a response 
to increased downside risk upon the violation of specific price thresholds during market 
declines, have also been found to be conducive to feedback trading. What is more, fund 
managers often resort to “window-dressing” by including recently outperforming stocks in 
their portfolios (in effect, positive feedback trading) in an attempt to improve their image as 
regards their stock selection skills and minimize the career-/reputation-related risks associated 
with holding losing stocks (Lakonishok et al., 1992).Aside from risk-mitigating considerations, 
feedback trading can also be driven by rational speculators (De Long et al., 1990) taking 
 
2 See, for example, Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999), Sias (2004) and Voronkova and Bohl (2005). 
3 See, for example, Brennan and Cao (1997), Kang and Stulz (1997), Choe et al. (1999), Dahlquist and Robertson 
(2001), Froot et al. (2001), Kim and Wei (2002a, b), Kalev et al. (2008) and Lin and Swanson (2008). 
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advantage of their informational superiority by trading ahead of anticipated news’ arrival and 
launching trends in the market, in order to induce their noise counterparts to ride on those trends 
with the intention of preying on them. Finally, feedback trading can also be motivated through 
price-based strategies, including technical analysis (Lo et al., 2000) and style investing, in 
particular momentum and contrarian trading (Galariotis, 2014).   
Empirically, feedback trading has been found to constitute a very frequently encountered 
strategy among institutional investors internationally (Choi and Skiba, 2015). Evidence from 
the US denotes the presence of widespread (mostly positive) feedback trading among fund 
managers there (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al., 1995; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; 
Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004; Froot and Teo, 2008; Choi and Sias, 2009;Frijns et al., 2016), with 
the evidence growing more extensive in studies covering more recent decades. Similar 
tendencies have been reported for fund managers in other markets, including Germany (Walter 
and Weber, 2006; Kremer and Nautz, 2013), Taiwan (Hung et al., 2010) and the UK (Wylie, 
2005). Retail investors have also been found to feedback trade, yet evidence on the latter 
appears more mixed.4The effect of the Asian financial crisis over feedback trading in Asian 
markets is rather unclear. Evidence in support of stronger positive feedback trading among 
foreign funds in South Korea before (after) the Asian crisis’ outbreak has been reported by 
Choe et al. (1999) (Kim and Wei, 2002a, b), while Bowe and Domuta (2004)showed that 
feedback trading was largely insignificant among both foreign and domestic investors in 
Indonesia both within and outside the Asian crisis. At the market level, a multitude of studies 
(Sentana and Wadhwani, 1992; Koutmos, 1997; Koutmos and Saidi, 2001; Watanabe, 2002; 
Koutmos et al., 2006; Bohl and Siklos, 2008) have showcased that positive feedback trading is 
 
4 Significant negative feedback trading has been reported for retail investors in Australia (Colwell et al., 2008) 
and Finland (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000), no feedback trading has been discovered among retail traders in 
China (Feng and Seasholes, 2004), while Dorn et al. (2008) found that German retail investors’ market orders 
(executed limit orders) were associated with positive (negative) feedback trading. 
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prolific internationally, giving rise to negative first-order autocorrelation, whose magnitude 
rises with volatility. As a result, positive feedback trading increases during high volatility 
periods, with most of the above studies also finding that it appears stronger during down, 
compared to up, markets (i.e. is directionally asymmetric). In addition, the significance of 
feedback trading has been found to vary with changes in the institutional environment; the 
introduction of index (Antoniou et al., 2005) and single stock futures (Chau et al., 2008) has 
been found to dampen positive feedback trading in the underlying spot segments of developed 
markets internationally, while the ownership liberalization reforms in Chinese equity markets5 
have led to a reduction in their positive feedback trading (Schuppli and Bohl, 2010). Recent 
evidence further indicates that positive feedback trading is more prevalent during periods of 
optimistic sentiment in index futures (Kurov, 2008), ETF(Chau et al., 2011)and equity (Hu et 
al., 2015) markets, while Chau and Deesomsak(2015) produced evidence in support of its 
presence growing more significant during periods of economic expansion in developed equity 
markets.  
We now turn to the Ramadan month and how it has been found to affect stock markets in 
majority Muslim countries. To begin with, Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic (also 
known as “Hegirian”) calendar, the latter consisting of twelve months whose identification is 
based strictly on lunar cycles.6As a result, the Islamic calendar is shorter than the Gregorian 
one (the one used by most countries internationally, based on solar cycles) by around eleven 
days, leading the mapping of each month of the Islamic calendar on the Gregorian one to shift 
by around two weeks each year.7 Ramadan is a month during which Muslims practice fasting 
 
5  These reforms pertain to the opening of A-shares to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) in 
November 2002 and B-shares to domestic investors in February 2001.   
6 The twelve months are: Muharram, Safar, Rabi I, Rabi II, Jumada I, Jumada II, Rajab, Sha’ban, Ramadan, 
Shawwal, Dhu al-Qa’da and Dhu al-Hijja; see Al-Khazali (2014). 
7 With each lunar cycle lasting approximately 29-30 days, the Islamic year contains354 days (as opposed to 365 
of the Gregorian one); as a result, each month of the Islamic calendar falls around eleven days earlier in each 
successive solar year (i.e. year of the Gregorian calendar). For more on this, see Al-Hajieh et al. (2011). 
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during day light, while also refraining from smoking and other sensual pleasures. Praying is 
central to this month (with mosques holding special prayers, known as “Tarawih”, every night 
during the Ramadan) as is reading the entire Qur’an (Al-Hajieh et al., 2011). The atmosphere 
permeating Ramadan entails spiritual uplifting, euphoria and enhanced social interactions 
(Daradkeh, 1992; Knerr and Pearl, 2008; Białkowski et al., 2012), culminating in a state of 
positivity in the emotions experienced and the overall social mood. Owing to the unique nature 
of Ramadan, a series of studies has investigated whether it confers a special effect over return 
dynamics in majority Muslim markets. As a general observation, most studies have recorded 
positive equity returns during Ramadan (Oğuzsoy and Güven, 2004; Al-Hajieh et al., 
2011;Białkowski et al., 2012, 2013; Al-Khazali, 2014), with evidence from other studies 
(Seyyed et al., 2005;Almudhaf, 2012) being rather mixed. A rather more consistent picture 
emerges with respect to Ramadan’s effect over volatility and volume, with the general 
consensus 8  being that both decline in-Ramadan (Seyyed et al., 2005, Ariss et al., 2011; 
Białkowski et al., 2012, 2013; Alrashidi et al., 2014). It is likely that the lower volatility 
reported during Ramadan is the result of the slowdown of trading activity(courtesy of the day 
long fasting and lack of productivity),and the shorter trading hours9leading to lower volumes 
of trade in-Ramadan, in line with the established positive relationship between volatility and 
volume (Karpoff, 1987).10,11  
 
8Conversely, Al-Hajieh et al. (2011) document increased volatility during Ramadan for six majority Muslim 
markets (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). 
9 Significant reductions in the duration of trading sessions are observed in several majority Muslim countries’ 
markets during Ramadan. As reported on their respective stock exchanges’ websites, the duration of equity trading 
sessions is found to decrease in-Ramadan by 16% in Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan, 28% in Egypt, 33% in 
Morocco, 37% in Tunisia and 50% in Turkey; on the other hand, no such reduction is observed in-Ramadan for 
stock markets in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  
10 On the contrary, recent evidence (Lai and Windawati, 2017) suggests that Ramadan brings forth higher volatility 
in Indonesia, whereas volatility in Malaysia exhibits variations across that month; what is more, trading activity 
appears to be picking up in-Ramadan. 
11  Other Islamic celebrations are also found to affect majority-Muslim markets; Wasiuzzaman (2018), for 
example, demonstrated that the Hajj pilgrimage is associated with elevated volatility in the Saudi market.  
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The aforementioned effects of Ramadan specifically with respect to social mood and volatility 
raise the issue of Ramadan possibly also affecting feedback trading, given the interactions that 
feedback trading has been found to maintain with these two factors. However, these 
interactions do not manifest themselves homogeneously. While, in theory, Ramadan can boost 
positive feedback trading as a result of the positive social mood (and, potentially, positive 
sentiment) accompanying that month, its widely reported lower volatility levels (compared to 
other months of the Islamic calendar) would be expected to confer the exact opposite effect 
(since positive feedback trading tends to be associated with high volatility).Drawing on these 
two opposite potential effects of Ramadan over feedback trading, we form two competing 
hypotheses, which we term “sentiment hypothesis” and “volatility hypothesis”, respectively, 
and which we shall now discuss in more detail.  
The sentiment hypothesis relies on the fact that Ramadan promotes positive social mood in 
majority Muslim markets and it is possible that this translates into optimistic sentiment among 
their investors12, rendering them less averse to selecting risky investment options (Wright and 
Bower, 1992). This reduction in risk aversion can further be encouraged by the fact that returns 
during Ramadan are expected to be, on average, positive. Armed with this knowledge, investors 
may grow in overconfidence13 and trade on the anticipated uptrend of prices during Ramadan, 
either by choosing to ride on it (positive feedback trade) or buck it (negative feedback 
trade).14The enhanced social interactions observed during Ramadan are expected to render such 
 
12 For more details on how social mood relates to investors’ sentiment, see Nofsinger (2005). 
13 Upward trending markets are more likely to lead to the realization of profits, prompting investors to trade more 
aggressively, as they tend to ascribe these profits to their superior trading skills (due to self-attribution, one of the 
constituent biases of overconfidence – see Barber et al., 2007). 
14Evidence (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Lamont and Thaler, 2003) indicates that price upswings tend to 
encourage noise trading in the market, something relevant here since feedback trading does not rely on 
fundamentals (in effect being a noise trading strategy). 
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a pattern more widespread among investors15, leading feedback trading to appear stronger 
during, compared to outside, Ramadan. 
The volatility hypothesis relates to the fact that majority Muslim markets exhibit low volatility 
during Ramadan compared to other months of the Islamic calendar. The crux of this hypothesis 
hinges on the wealth of evidence (see previous discussion) on the interactive relationship 
between volatility and feedback trading, according to which positive feedback trading grows 
in magnitude as volatility rises. As a result, this would suggest that feedback trading is expected 
to be weaker in-Ramadan compared to non-Ramadan days. An additional avenue of support to 
this hypothesis emanates from the fact thatnoise trading in general (Black, 1986), and feedback 
trading in particular (Kodres, 1994; Miwa and Ueda, 2011), have been traditionally associated 
with increased volumes of trade. As a result, the typically low volumes observed during 
Ramadan would suggest that feedback trading is less pronounced during that month, while at 
the same time being (courtesy of the positive volatility-volume relationship) in line with the 
lower volatility levels reported during Ramadan. 
In view of the above, our study empirically tests for the effect of Ramadan over feedback 
trading in a set of eleven majority Muslim markets (Egypt; Jordan; Indonesia; Malaysia; 
Morocco; Oman; Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; Tunisia; Turkey; United Arab Emirates) for the 
29/6/2001 – 1/8/2016 period. Our study addresses the following research questions: 
i. Do investors feedback trade in majority Muslim markets? 
ii. Does their feedback trading exhibit asymmetric properties contingent on market 
performance? 
iii. Is their feedback trading subject to the Ramadan effect? 
 
15 This is possible, more so considering the evidence reported in Gavriilidis et al. (2016) in support of herding 
being stronger during, compared to outside, Ramadan in majority Muslim markets. 
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iv. Does this Ramadan effect vary before and after the global financial crisis? 
Overall, our results for the full sample period indicate that six of our sample markets present 
us with significant positive feedback trading, with little evidence of the latter manifesting itself 
asymmetrically during up versus down markets. Controlling for Ramadan, we find that 
feedback trading is more evident outside (positive feedback trading is present in eight markets) 
as opposed to within Ramadan (positive feedback trading is present in three markets) for the 
full sample window, withsimilar patterns emerging both before and after the global financial 
crisis period. Our results, therefore, confirm the presence of a Ramadan effect in feedback 
trading by showing that feedback trading appears weaker within Ramadan, thus lending support 
to the volatility hypothesis proposed above.With feedback trading appearing strong in most of 
our sample markets outside Ramadan only, the dissipation of its presence during Ramadan may 
possibly be due to the generalized slowdown in business and financial activity in majority 
Muslim countries during that month fostering the decline of investors’ transactions in their 
stock exchanges. Another possibility is that the low volumes typifying Ramadan increase 
frictions in the trading process (e.g. by delaying the timely execution of orders), rendering it 
more difficult for feedback traders to implement their strategies, and thus culminating in the 
reduction of their presence during that month. 
These results are presented for the first time in the literature and entail very interesting 
implications for researchers, as they denote that the lower volatility that has been widely 
documented within Ramadan may also be behaviourally motivated, being related to a reduced 
presence of feedback traders during that month. This is an important finding, as it offers novel 
insight into the effect of Ramadan over majority Muslim markets’ trading dynamics, while 
suggesting that Ramadan is a month that should be controlled for when testing for feedback 
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trading (as well as other forms of behaviourally motivated trading16) in these markets. From 
the perspective of the investment community, these findings are notably interesting, as they 
allow those investing in these markets (particularly those practicing feedback style strategies) 
the opportunity to use the interaction between feedback trading and the Ramadan effect 
documented in this study as input for their strategies (for example, by conditioning their 
feedback trading on the observed/anticipated feedback trading within/outside Ramadan). What 
is more, with some of the market indices utilized in our study constituting the underlying 
benchmarks for index-based products 17  in their respective markets, our results are also 
particularly relevant to those investing in those products, as they allow them direct insight into 
these benchmarks’ trading dynamics which they can use to inform their trades. From a 
regulatory viewpoint, the presence of significant feedback trading in our sample markets 
suggests the potential for destabilizing market outcomes, more so given the association of 
feedback trading with volatility. As a result, it would be useful for regulators and policy makers 
in emerging and frontier markets (the two categories to which our sample markets belong) to 
consider measures aiming at reducing the footprint of feedback trading in their stock 
exchanges. One such possibility would be to introduce initiatives aiming at fostering 
information transparency and financial literacy, in order to improve investors’ understanding 
of investing and trust toward public information, thus, in effect, reducing their reliance on past 
price patterns. 
The rest of our study is organized as follows: section 2 presents the data employed in this study 
alongside a series of descriptive statistics, before introducing the empirical design implemented 
 
16 The only other study we are aware of that explores the Ramadan effect in investors’ behavioural trading is the 
one by Gavriilidis et al. (2016), who tested for the Ramadan effect over herding in seven majority Muslim markets. 
17 Exchange-traded products that use our sample’s indices as benchmarks include the EFG-Hermes Egypt Fund 
(Egypt), the Next Funds FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI ETF (Malaysia), the ICBC Equity Fund (Turkey), the 




to test for the aforementioned research questions. Section 3 presents and discusses the results 
and section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data-Methodology 
Our data includes daily closing prices for the following domestic indices of eleven majority 
Muslim countries’ stock exchanges: EFG Index (Egypt), Amman Stock Exchange General 
Index (Jordan), IDX Composite (Indonesia), FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia), CFG 25 
(Morocco), MSM 30 (Oman), KSE 100 (Pakistan), Tadawul All Share (Saudi Arabia), 
Tunindex (Tunisia), Borsa Istanbul 100 (Turkey) and ADX General Index (United Arab 
Emirates). The data covers the period between June 29th, 2001 and August 1st, 2016 and was 
obtained from the Thomson-Reuters DataStream database.  
Table 1, Panel A presents a series of descriptive statistics for our sample indices’ log-
differenced returns, including their mean, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the 
Jarque-Bera test statistic and the Ljung-Box test statistics for returns and squared returns for 
ten lags. As the table indicates, all eleven markets’ indices posted positive average returns 
during our sample period, with the largest (smallest) mean value being detected for Pakistan’s 
KSE 100 (Morocco’s CFG 25) index. The most volatile index (as indicated by the largest 
standard deviation value) is Turkey’s BIST 100, while Tunisia’s Tunindex is the least volatile 
one. With the exception of the UAE, the rest ten indices exhibit negative skewness, while all 
eleven indices are leptokurtic, suggesting substantial departures from normality, something 
further supported by the significant values of the Jarque-Bera normality test statistic. To test 
whether the non-normality evident in our sample indices is due to temporal dependencies in 
their structure, we first perform the Ljung-Box test on returns and find that all but one 
(Jordan’s) of its statistics generate significant values. This denotes the presence of significant 
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autocorrelation in our indices’ returns, without, however, allowing us to assert its source; 
autocorrelation could be due to market inefficiencies (such as non-synchronous trading) or 
feedback traders fomenting price-trends. With feedback trading being traditionally associated 
with high volatility (Koutmos, 2014), we perform the Ljung-Box test on squared returns, to 
gauge whether there exist dependencies at the second moment of returns. Our results confirm 
this, as the statistics we obtain are significant for all eleven market indices, with their values 
appearing always higher compared to the Ljung-Box test statistics previously reported on 
index-returns, thus denoting the presence of time-variance for our indices’ volatility. Panel B 
in Table 1 further shows that our sample indices exhibit considerable correlations among 
themselves, with the correlation coefficient, in most cases, exceeding 0.5 and the average 
correlation standing at 0.61. 
Our empirical design hinges on the model proposed by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), which 
postulates that the market is populated by two types of investors (rational speculators and 
feedback traders), each basing their trades on a different notion of price formation. On the one 
hand, rational speculators maximize their utility by relying on a mean-variance framework, 
with their demand function being the following:  
𝑄𝑡 =  
𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡)−𝛼
𝜃𝜎𝑡
2       (1) 
In the above equation, 𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡)is the expectation formulated in period 𝑡 − 1 regarding period 
𝑡’s return;𝛼 is the risk-free rate of return;θ is the time-invariant coefficient of risk-aversion; 
and 𝜎𝑡
2 is the conditional variance at period 𝑡.  
On the other hand, feedback traders view returns as trend-prone, with their demand adhering 
to the following function: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛾𝑟𝑡−1                                                                         (2) 
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The demand of feedback traders in period 𝑡depends on the performance of returns in the 
previous period. If 𝑟𝑡−1 > 0 and they are positive (negative) feedback trading, then 𝛾 > 0 (𝛾 <
0) and they will buy (sell); conversely, if 𝑟𝑡−1 < 0 and they are positive (negative) feedback 
trading, then 𝛾 > 0 (𝛾 < 0) and they will sell (buy). 
In equilibrium all shares must be held and, given the joint presence of the two aforementioned 
trader-types, the following must hold: 
𝑄𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 = 1      (3) 
Equation (3) can then be expanded by substituting each trader-type’s demand function 
(Equations (1) and (2)) as follows: 
𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡) = 𝛼 − 𝛾𝑟𝑡−1𝜃𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜃𝜎𝑡
2     (4) 
Converting the expected return into a realized one by assuming its rational expectation [𝑟𝑡 =
𝔼𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡) + 𝑡], we obtain the following equation, where 𝑡 follows a stochastic process: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 − 𝛾𝑟𝑡−1𝜃𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜃𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝑡    (5) 
Equation (5) shows that accounting for the presence of traders whose conduct deviates from 
the strictly rational paradigm can give rise to versatile market dynamics. At first glance, the 
term 𝛾𝑟𝑡−1𝜃𝜎𝑡
2 indicates that autocorrelation rises with volatility (𝜎𝑡
2); however, the sign of 
this autocorrelation depends on the sign of the feedback trading prevailing in the marketplace. 
If positive (negative) feedback traders dominate,𝛾 > 0 (𝛾 < 0) and the autocorrelation will be 
negative (positive). Considering evidence (Le Baron, 1992; Campbell et al., 1993; Säfvenblad, 
2000; Faff and McKenzie, 2007) showcasing that autocorrelation decreases as volatility 
increases, we would expect positive feedback trading to grow in significance during rising 
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volatility periods. 18  However, feedback trading is only one possible driver of return 
autocorrelation, since the latter can also be motivated by market frictions (such as thinness in 
trading activity). With 𝛾 not allowing us to disentangle between the two possibilities, Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992) proposed the following ad hoc modification of Equation (5): 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡    (6) 
In the above equation, the part of autocorrelation due to market frictions is represented by 𝜙0 
and that due to feedback trading by 𝜙1 .As𝜙1 = −𝜃𝛾 , the presence of positive (negative) 
feedback trading will be reflected through significantly negative (positive) values of𝜙1. 
With investors’ risk aversion growing during market declines, positive feedback trading can be 
promoted during down markets via strategies such as portfolio insurance and stop loss orders, 
which aim at minimizing losses following negative market performance. We test for the 
possibility of positive feedback trading being stronger during market slumps using the 
following specification proposed by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992): 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜙2|𝑟𝑡−1| 𝑡 .  (7) 
In the above equation, the coefficient of𝑟𝑡−1now becomes: 
 
𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝜎𝑡
2+𝜙2, if 𝑟𝑡−1 > 0       (8) 
𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝜎𝑡
2-𝜙2, if 𝑟𝑡−1 < 0     
     
 
18 This is because, as mentioned above, positive feedback trading (𝛾 > 0) would lead to negative first-order return 




Equation (8) suggests that significantly positive values of 𝜙2denote the presence of stronger 
positive feedback trading during down markets. 
To empirically investigate whether feedback trading varies within, as opposed to outside, 
Ramadan, we employ the following modified version of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) 
model, based on Chau et al. (2011): 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼1(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜃0𝐷𝑡𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝐷𝑡)𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝐷𝑡(𝜙0,0 + 𝜙1,0𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 +
(1 − 𝐷𝑡)(𝜙0,1 + 𝜙1,1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡      (9) 
Equation (9) allows us to gauge how the variables of Equation (6) vary within, as compared to 
outside, Ramadan, with the dummy variable 𝐷𝑡being equal to one for all days falling within 
Ramadan each year, zero otherwise.19 
To estimate Equations (6), (7) and (9), we define the conditional variance (𝜎𝑡
2) equation as 
following an asymmetric GARCH specification (Glosten et al., 1993):  
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛽 𝑡−1
2 + 𝜆𝜎𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2 ,(10) 
Utilizing an asymmetric GARCH specification allows us to formally test for asymmetric 
volatility, i.e. capture potential asymmetries in volatility in the aftermath of positive ( 𝑡−1>0) 
versus negative ( 𝑡−1 < 0) shocks. In the above equation, 𝐼𝑡−1equals one if the lagged shock 
is negative and zero otherwise; if the value of 𝛿 is significantly positive, this will indicate that 
volatility rises more following negative shocks than positive ones. 
To assess the effect of the global financial crisis over our estimations, we partition our sample 
period into a pre (29/6/2001 – 9/10/2007) and a post (10/10/2007 – 1/8/2016) crisis’ outbreak 
sub period and re-estimate Equations (9) and (10) for each. The choice of October 9th, 2007 as 
 
19 The identification of Ramadan days follows the procedure outlined in Al-Khazali (2014). 
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the cut-off point here is motivated by the fact that the Dow Jones Industrial Average index in 
the US reached its peak (14,164.53 units) on that day, prior to embarking on a descending 
course afterwards that continued unabated throughout the ground-breaking events of 2008, 
before reaching its bottom on the 6th of March, 2009 (Guney et al., forthcoming). For robustness 
purposes and to factor out the effect of the crisis period (10/10/2007 – 6/3/2009), we also re-
estimate Equations (9) and (10) for the period between 9/3/2009 and 1/8/2016.20 
To get an initial overview of the return dynamics of our sample indices within versus outside 
Ramadan, we estimate the following set of equations for the full sample period: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔1𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔2(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝑡                  (11) 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 +  𝛾 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2                (12) 
Similar to Equation (9) above, 𝐷𝑡is equal to one for all days falling within Ramadan each year, 
zero otherwise. Equation (11) is the conditional mean equation, where the constant term is 
conditioned upon the presence of Ramadan (coefficients 𝜔1 and 𝜔2), while Equation (12) is 
the equivalent of Equation (10) above, with its unconditional volatility term conditioned on 
Ramadan’s presence (coefficients 𝛼1 and 𝛼2). Results are presented in Table 2 and they show 
that average index returns are higher inside (𝜔1) compared to outside Ramadan (𝜔2) for nine 
markets, with the difference between 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 being insignificant in most cases. On the other 
hand, we notice that 𝛼1 <𝛼2   in all eleven markets, with the difference between the two 
coefficients being significant in the majority (eight) of cases. These results are interesting, as 
they are in line with prior findings (see the discussion in the previous section) showcasing that 
 
20 In theory, we could perform our estimations separately for the crisis sub period (10/10/2007 – 6/3/2009) and 
the post crisis one (9/3/2009 – 1/8/2016). However, the 10/10/2007 – 6/3/2009 sub period entails 367 trading days 
in total, only 26 of which fall within Ramadan. 23 of those days belong to the Ramadan of year 2008 (1-30/9/2008) 
and the remaining 3 are the last three days of the immediately previous Ramadan (13/9-12/10/2007). Estimating 
a model using such a small number of Ramadan days (essentially corresponding to a single Ramadan) is bound 
to raise estimation issues, while the fact that Ramadan in 2008 corresponded to a very turbulent period for global 
financial markets (September 2008) would render disentangling the Ramadan effect from the effect of the events 
of September 2008 very difficult.   
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majority Muslim markets tend to maintain higher returns and lower volatility during Ramadan 
compared to other months of the Islamic calendar.  
 
3. Results – Discussion 
We begin our discussion with the presentation of the results from the estimation of Equations 
(6) and (10) for our eleven markets’ indices for the full sample period. As the results reported 
in Table 3 indicate, six of our sample markets (Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia 
and Turkey) accommodate positive feedback trading, as the significantly21 negative values of 
𝜙1 indicate. The coefficient 𝜙0 is significantly positive across all eleven markets, denoting the 
prevalence of significantly positive first-order autocorrelation in their indices’ return structure. 
With all eleven markets being either emerging or frontier in designation22, these results are in 
line with evidence reported in the literature (Chaudhuri and Wu, 2003; De Groot et al., 2012) 
confirming the presence of inefficiencies for these categories of markets. Volatility is highly 
persistent across all eleven markets (𝛽 is always significant) and responds significantly to news 
(𝛾 assumes significant values in all cases), more so when the news is negative (as denoted by 
the significantly positive values of the coefficient 𝛿 for most – eight - of our sample markets).  
Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of Equations (7) and (10), where we test for 
directional asymmetry in the estimated feedback trading of our sample markets. Results suggest 
again the presence of positive feedback trading in the same six markets as in Table 3 with 
evidence of directional asymmetry surfacing for only two of them (𝜙2 is significantly positive 
for Jordan and Tunisia).An interesting (and, perhaps, counterintuitive) findings that two of our 
 
21 For brevity purposes, we are using the 10 percent significance level to determine significance in this study (i.e. 
any estimate with a p-value less than 0.1 shall be deemed statistically significant).  
22 An example of such classification is the FTSE Country Classification List of September 2015 in the following 
link: http://www.ftserussell.com/sites/default/files/research/ftse_country_classification_process_final.pdf. All 
eleven markets (except Saudi Arabia, which is not included) are classified there as emerging or frontier.  
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sample markets (Indonesia; Malaysia) present us with insignificant positive feedback trading 
(𝜙1 is insignificantly negative), yet 𝜙2 is significantly positive for both of them.This has been 
documented before in the literature23 and a possible explanation for it is that 𝜙1 is insignificant 
because of the presence of countervailing positive and negative feedback trading forces in the 
market (whose interaction leads feedback trading to appear, on average, insignificant across 
the full sample period), while 𝜙2 is significantly positive because market downturns prompt 
the emergence of strong positive feedback trading (due e.g. to portfolio insurance, stop loss 
orders, panic selling etc.).As per volatility, it again appears highly persistent for all markets 
and asymmetric for most (eight) of them.  
We now turn to examining the effect of Ramadan over feedback trading in majority Muslim 
markets by presenting the results from the estimation of Equations (9) and (10) in Table 5 for 
the full sample period. The findings reported are indicative of the presence of notable 
inefficiencies among our sample’s eleven market indices, particularly outside Ramadan (𝜙0,1 
is significantly positive for all of them) and for several of them within Ramadan as well (𝜙0,0 
is significantly positive for five of them). 24  Evidence of feedback trading is mainly 
concentrated outside Ramadan, with 𝜙1,1 being significantly negative (indicative of positive 
feedback trading) for eight indices; conversely, positive feedback trading is detected for only 
three indices within Ramadan.25Considering the interactive relationship between feedback 
trading and volatility in the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) framework, our results lend support 
to the volatility hypothesis outlined earlier in this study, by showcasing that positive feedback 
trading bears limited presence during (as opposed to outside) Ramadan, when volatility is lower 
(compared to non-Ramadan days, as we showed in Table 2). This is a very interesting finding, 
 
23 Exploring feedback trading for a sample of eighteen currencies, Laopodis (2005) came across two cases (French 
franc; Portuguese escudo) whereby𝜙2 was significantly positive, yet𝜙1 was insignificant. 
24 The hypothesis 𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1 is rejected on three occasions (Jordan; Pakistan; UAE). 
25 The hypothesis 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1 is rejected on four occasions (Egypt; Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; UAE). 
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which we believe is related to the traditionally documented low volumes during Ramadan in 
majority Muslim countries. With feedback trading appearing strong in most of our sample 
markets outside Ramadan only, itis possible that its dissipation in-Ramadan is due to the 
generalized slowdown in business and financial activity in these countries during that month 
fostering the decline of investors’ transactions in their stock exchanges. It is also possible that 
Ramadan’s low volumes increase frictions in the trading process (e.g. by delaying the timely 
execution of orders), rendering it more difficult for feedback traders to implement their 
strategies, and thus resulting in their reduced presence during Ramadan. Again here, volatility 
appears highly persistent for all markets and asymmetric for most (eight) of them.  
Table 6 presents the results from the estimation of Equations (9) and (10) for the period prior 
to the outbreak of the global financial crisis (29/6/2001 – 9/10/2007). Similar to the results 
presented in Table 5, the first-order autocorrelation appears more prolific outside, as opposed 
to within, Ramadan, with 𝜙0,1 (𝜙0,0) being significantly positive in nine (two) markets. As for 
feedback trading, more evidence in support of its presence surfaces outside (𝜙1,1 is significant 
in five markets)26, compared to within, Ramadan (𝜙1,0  is significant in Oman only), thus 
providing evidence in favor of the volatility hypothesis, in line with the full sample period 
results reported in Table 5.Volatility is again shown to be persistent and responding 
significantly to news for all markets27, yet appears less asymmetric as the fewer significantly 
positive values of 𝛿 suggest.28 
The period following the outbreak of the global financial crisis (10/10/2007 – 1/8/2016) is 
characterized by mixed evidence regarding the occurrence of feedback trading within versus 
 
26𝜙1,1is significantly negative (indicative of positive feedback trading) for Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
the UAE, with its value being significantly positive (indicative of negative feedback trading) for Tunisia.  
27 The sole exception here is Indonesia, where volatility autocorrelation (i.e. the response of volatility to news) is 
insignificant, as the insignificant 𝛾-value for that market indicates in Table 6. 
28𝛿 is significantly positive for five markets only.  
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outside Ramadan. As the results from the estimation of Equations (9) and (10) in Table 7 
indicate, both 𝜙1,0  and 𝜙1,1 are significant in three markets each, thus showing that the 
previously documented (full sample period; pre crisis’ outbreak) pattern of prevalent feedback 
trading outside Ramadan dissipates following the crisis’ outbreak. Conversely, the significant 
temporal dependencies in our sample indices persist, particularly outside Ramadan29, while 
volatility manifests itself persistently and asymmetrically for all eleven market indices.30 An 
issue, however, arising with the post outbreak period is that it encompasses the 10/10/2007 – 
6/3/2009 window, which saw the climax of the crisis’ impact internationally. To factor out that 
window’s effect from our estimations (and given the discussion in footnote 20 above), we 
repeat the estimation of Equations (9) and (10) for the 9/3/2009 - 1/8/2016 period. Results are 
presented in Table 8 and provide us with a rather different picture compared to Table 7, with 
positive feedback trading being evident in six markets outside Ramadan and completely absent 
in-Ramadan, in line with the evidence presented in Tables 5 and 6 in support of the volatility 
hypothesis. Similar to previous tables, our sample indices exhibit more evidence of first-order 
autocorrelation outside, compared to within, Ramadan31, with their volatility being strongly 
persistent and asymmetric.32 
Overall, our results showcase that feedback trading manifests itself for the majority of our 
sample markets outside Ramadan, with its presence during Ramadan appearing rather limited; 
this finding holds both for the full sample period, as well as before and after the global financial 
crisis period of 10/10/2007 – 6/3/2009. The evidence presented here lends little support to the 
sentiment hypothesis proposed in the beginning of this study, thus denoting that the positive 
mood permeating majority Muslim countries during Ramadan does not translate into stronger 
 
29𝜙0,1 (𝜙0,0) is significantly positive in nine (four) markets. 
30 The sole exception here is Jordan, where no volatility asymmetry surfaces (𝛿 is insignificant). 
31𝜙0,1 (𝜙0,0) is significantly positive in eight (two) markets. 
32 The sole exception here is Jordan, where no volatility asymmetry surfaces (𝛿 is insignificant). 
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feedback trading on their investors’ behalf for that month. On the contrary, our evidence is 
more supportive of the volatility hypothesis, as feedback trading manifests itself less strongly 
during Ramadan (compared to non-Ramadan days), whose volatility is lower (compared to the 
rest of the months of the Islamic calendar, something that has both been established in the 
relevant literature and empirically confirmed in our study).Our findings are very interesting 
from a research perspective, as they raise, for the first time, the possibility that the lower 
volatility that has been widely documented in-Ramadan by several studies may well be the 
result of the reduced presence of feedback traders during that month. A possible explanation 
for this is that the generalized slowdown of the overall business and financial activity 
characterizing Ramadan in majority Muslim countries foments a decline in their investors’ 
transactions (reflected through lower volumes) during that month, leading feedback traders to 
appear less active during (compared to outside) Ramadan. An alternative explanation here is 
that the reduced feedback trading in-Ramadan may be due to Ramadan’s traditionally observed 
low volumes increasing frictions in the trading process, leading feedback traders (indeed, any 
trader at all) to face difficulties in the implementation of their strategies during that month; if 
so, the low volatility observed during Ramadan could be ascribed to feedback traders being 
discouraged by Ramadan’s low volumes from trading as actively during that month, compared 
to outside it. 
An interesting issue here pertains to the fact that, with investors being aware of Ramadan’s 
positive expected returns, one would anticipate some evidence of profit taking, reflected 
through negative feedback trading on their behalf during that month. As we have shown, this 
is not the case, since the limited evidence of feedback trading documented during Ramadan 
pertains almost always to positive feedback trading.33Although we cannot be certain of the 
 
33 The sole exception here relates to 𝜙1,0 , which assumes a significantly positive value for the UAE in Table 7, 
testing for the Ramadan effect during the 10/10/2007 – 1/8/2016 period. 
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reasons underlying the absence of profit taking during a month traditionally associated with 
positive market performance, it is possible that the low volumes observed during that month 
are partially responsible for this, as they render profit taking less feasible by increasing the 
frictions in the trading process. 
 
4. Conclusion  
This study examines whether feedback trading is subject to the Ramadan effect, in view of 
extensive evidence on the role of religion in investment decision making in several markets 
internationally. Drawing on a set of indices from eleven majority Muslim markets for the 
29/6/2001-1/8/2016 period, we report evidence showing that feedback traders are active in 
several of these markets, with their presence appearing stronger outside, rather than within, 
Ramadan. With volatility during Ramadan being traditionally lower compared to the rest of the 
months of the Islamic calendar, our findings raise, for the first time, the possibility that the 
lower volatility that has been widely documented in-Ramadan by several studies may well be 
the result of the reduction in the presence of feedback traders during that month. This is a very 
interesting finding, which we believe is related to the traditionally documented low volumes 
during Ramadan in majority Muslim countries, since the generalized slowdown in business and 
financial activity in these countries during that month fosters the decline of investors’ 
transactions in their stock exchanges and this may well produce an adverse effect over the 
presence of feedback trading in-Ramadan. It is also possible that this is due to Ramadan’s low 
volumes increasing frictions in the trading process (e.g. by delaying the timely execution of 
orders), thus rendering it more difficult for feedback traders to implement their strategies and 
resulting in their reduced presence during Ramadan. 
23 
 
These results bear very interesting implications for researchers, as they offer novel insights into 
Ramadan’s effect over investors’ behaviour in majority Muslim markets by showcasing that 
the lower volatility/volume widely reported during that month is related to their investors’ 
feedback trading, while further suggesting that Ramadan’s effect should be controlled for when 
studying behavioural investment patterns in these markets. The findings presented here are also 
of particular relevance to those investing in these markets (especially those subscribing to 
feedback trading styles), as the interaction between feedback trading and the Ramadan effect 
documented in this study can be used to inform their strategies, by allowing them, for example, 
the opportunity to condition their trades on the observed/anticipated feedback trading 
within/outside Ramadan. With some of the market indices in our sample constituting the 
underlying benchmarks for index based products in their respective markets, our results also 
allow those investing in these products additional insight into their benchmarks’ trading 
dynamics which they can use as input when formulating their trading strategies. From a 
regulatory viewpoint, the presence of significant feedback trading in our sample markets 
suggests the potential for destabilizing market outcomes, more so given the association of 
feedback trading with volatility. As a result, it would be useful for regulators and policy makers 
in emerging and frontier markets (the two categories to which our sample markets belong) to 
consider measures aiming at reducing the footprint of feedback trading in their stock 
exchanges. One such possibility would be to introduce initiatives aiming at fostering 
information transparency and financial literacy, in order to improve investors’ understanding 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations for the returns of our sample markets’ indices 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Skewness Excess kurtosis Jarque-Bera LB(10) LB2(10) 
Egypt (EFG) 0.0673 1.6678 -0.5153*** 7.8074*** 10171.0461*** 101.012*** 346.631*** 
Indonesia (IDX) 0.0637 1.3434 -0.7123*** 7.6005*** 9806.8446*** 55.872*** 779.858*** 
Jordan (ASE GI) 0.0264 1.1310 -0.3657*** 56.0854*** 515961.9578*** 10.060 925.387*** 
Malaysia (FTSE BM KLCI) 0.0262 0.7513 -0.8637*** 12.2423*** 25068.6756*** 82.090*** 400.185*** 
Morocco (CFG 25) 0.0200 0.7801 -0.1546*** 7.2899*** 8731.2032*** 153.760*** 853.701*** 
Oman (MSM 30) 0.0321 0.9939 -0.8062*** 22.8336*** 85921.1127*** 156.888*** 1926.727*** 
Pakistan (KSE 100) 0.0856 1.3133 -0.3468*** 4.2218*** 3001.8856*** 77.152*** 1647.236*** 
Saudi Arabia (TADAWUL AS) 0.0242 1.5592 -0.5995*** 12.0475*** 24039.0598*** 41.235*** 1696.720*** 
Tunisia (TUNINDEX) 0.0355 0.5237 -0.4266*** 11.7798*** 22876.6949*** 345.126*** 1367.604*** 
Turkey (BIST 100) 0.0488 1.9018 -0.1523*** 4.3794*** 3160.5687*** 28.995*** 555.457*** 
UAE (ADX GI) 0.0382 1.4436 1.1183*** 253.5177*** 10541299.9540*** 36.548*** 953.789*** 
























Egypt (EFG) 1.00           
Indonesia (IDX) 0.72 1.00          
Jordan (ASE GI) 0.67 0.14 1.00         
Malaysia (FTSE BM KLCI) 0.77 0.98 0.19 1.00        
Morocco (CFG 25) 0.83 0.60 0.65 0.64 1.00       
Oman (MSM 30) 0.92 0.61 0.77 0.66 0.89 1.00      
Pakistan (KSE 100) 0.71 0.88 0.12 0.85 0.43 0.52 1.00     
Saudi Arabia (TADAWUL AS) 0.60 0.23 0.73 0.27 0.27 0.50 0.34 1.00    
Tunisia (TUNINDEX) 0.68 0.94 0.17 0.91 0.69 0.60 0.76 0.11 1.00   
Turkey (BIST 100) 0.78 0.97 0.25 0.97 0.64 0.65 0.87 0.35 0.91 1.00  
UAE (ADX GI) 0.78 0.50 0.68 0.53 0.43 0.69 0.67 0.83 0.36 0.56 1.00 
Panel A contains the following descriptive statistics for the log-differenced returns of our eleven sample markets’ indices for the 29/6/2001 – 1/8/2016 period: mean; standard deviation; skewness; excess kurtosis; Jarque-Bera 
normality test-statistic; Ljung-Box test statistics for returns and squared returns for ten lags. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Panel B contains the correlation matrix depicting 







Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates from the augmented Glosten et al. (1993) model (full sample period) 
Parameters  Egypt Indonesia Jordan Malaysia Morocco Oman Pakistan Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey UAE 
𝜔1 0.1818 0.1211 0.0084 0.0326 0.0647 0.1014 0.1639 0.0838 0.0349 0.1643 0.1696 
 (0.0076) (0.0271) (0.7700) (0.2730) (0.0308) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0995) (0.0932) (0.0539) (0.0000) 
𝜔2 0.0869 0.0744 0.0088 0.0289 0.0087 0.0478 0.1153 0.0885 0.0254 0.0660 0.0257 
 (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.4804) (0.0047) (0.4363) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0125) (0.0441) 
𝛼1 0.0610 0.0267 0.0087 0.0100 0.0356 0.0171 0.0534 0.0369 0.0169 0.0574 0.0148 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0003) 
𝑎2 0.1629 0.0632 0.0092 0.0127 0.0624 0.0460 0.0824 0.0476 0.0194 0.0909 0.0285 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛽 0.8354 0.8643 0.9123 0.8735 0.6694 0.8018 0.7858 0.8373 0.7463 0.8879 0.8023 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛾 0.0735 0.0578 0.1143 0.0759 0.2566 0.1256 0.1087 0.0827 0.1608 0.0564 0.1753 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛿 0.0757 0.0856 -0.0509 0.0620 -0.0116 0.0536 0.1186 0.1306 0.0527 0.0642 0.0855 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4979) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝐻0: 𝜔1 = 𝜔2 1.7729 0.6737 0.0002 0.0144 3.1018 3.2069 0.9740 0.0085 0.1926 1.2235 24.7481 
 (0.1830) (0.4118) (0.9887) (0.9045) (0.0782) (0.0733) (0.3237) (0.9267) (0.6608) (0.2687) (0.0000) 
𝐻0: 𝑎1 = 𝑎2 45.2866 20.5398 0.0329 1.4767 25.6894 257.3701 9.5620 3.6006 2.6673 3.4800 10.9156 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8560) (0.2243) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0578) (0.1024) (0.0621) (0.0010) 
The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates from the following set of equations for the 29/6/2001 – 1/8/2016 period for our eleven markets’ indices: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔1𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔2(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝑡 , 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 +  𝛾 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2  
𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable assuming the value of unity in-Ramadan, zero otherwise. Parentheses include p-values. The bottom two rows contain the chi-squared 
test values from testing the hypotheses 𝜔1 = 𝜔2  and 𝑎1 = 𝑎2 , respectively. The indices comprising our sample are: EFG Index (Egypt), Amman Stock 
Exchange General Index (Jordan), IDX Composite (Indonesia), FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia), CFG 25 (Morocco), MSM 30 (Oman), KSE 100 













Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates from the original Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model (full sample period) 



















































0.1580 0.1954 0.2262 0.1212 0.1403 0.2763 0.0774 0.1906 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0072) (0.0000) 
𝜙1 -0.0058 -0.0050 -0.0147 -0.0193 -0.0359 -0.0107 -0.0078 -0.0088 -0.0603 -0.0100 -0.0024 
 (0.1477) (0.4725) (0.0001) (0.5086) (0.0119) (0.0563) (0.2636) (0.0055) (0.0022) (0.0526) (0.1065) 
𝛼 0.1647 0.0598 0.0087 0.0120 0.0588 0.0429 0.0808 0.0451 0.0189 0.0852 0.0264 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0546) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛽 0.8277 0.8643 0.9124 0.8758 0.6855 0.8037 0.7836 0.8393 0.7555 0.8892 0.8004 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛾 0.0742 0.0526 0.1162 0.0704 0.2339 0.1128 0.0968 0.0728 0.1344 0.0538 0.1861 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛿 0.0783 0.0947 -0.0521 0.0681 -0.0132 0.0723 0.1487 0.1522 0.0685 0.0694 0.0677 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4067) (0.1703) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates from the following set of equations for the 29/6/2001 – 1/8/2016 period for our eleven markets’ 
indices: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝜃𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡 , 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 +  𝛾 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2  
Parentheses include the p-values of the estimates. The indices comprising our sample are: EFG Index (Egypt), Amman Stock Exchange General Index 
(Jordan), IDX Composite (Indonesia), FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia), CFG 25 (Morocco), MSM 30 (Oman), KSE 100 (Pakistan), Tadawul 







Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model controlling for directional asymmetry 
Parameters  
Egypt Indonesia Jordan Malaysia Morocco Oman Pakistan Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey UAE 
𝜔 
0.0629 0.0307 -0.0273 0.0003 -0.0012 0.0407 0.1181 0.0824 -0.0032 0.1010 0.0192 
 (0.1481) (0.3291) (0.0787) (0.9822) (0.9404) (0.0277) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7581) (0.0297) (0.1879) 
𝜃 0.0089 -0.0026 0.0240 -0.0041 0.0001 -0.0286 -0.0271 -0.0308 0.0269 -0.0203 0.0089 
 (0.6698) (0.9070) (0.2586) (0.9180) (0.9968) (0.2122) (0.1755) (0.0202) (0.6434) (0.2217) (0.5160) 
𝜙0 0.1753 0.1029 0.0732 0.1519 0.1963 0.2213 0.1178 0.1360 0.2657 0.0755 0.1876 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0089) (0.0000) 
𝜙1 -0.0060 -0.0040 -0.0161 -0.0173 -0.0366 -0.0101 -0.0074 -0.0086 -0.0589 -0.0098 -0.0025 
 (0.1407) (0.5787) (0.0001) (0.5513) (0.0092) (0.0878) (0.3025) (0.0076) (0.0026) (0.0586) (0.1026) 
𝜙2 -0.0118 0.0534 0.0622 0.0633 0.0436 0.0428 0.0119 0.0258 0.0712 0.0148 0.0273 
 (0.6469) (0.0480) (0.0017) (0.0166) (0.1490) (0.2879) (0.6843) (0.2992) (0.0111) (0.5805) (0.3053) 
𝛼 0.1650 0.0576 0.0078 0.0122 0.0589 0.0436 0.0806 0.0451 0.0182 0.0852 0.0262 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0383) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛽 0.8275 0.8672 0.9170 0.8753 0.6853 0.8011 0.7842 0.8398 0.7614 0.8893 0.8020 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛾 0.0743 0.0518 0.1132 0.0690 0.2358 0.1130 0.0966 0.0721 0.1311 0.0538 0.1848 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛿 0.0785 0.0926 -0.0541 0.0703 -0.0160 0.0751 0.1480 0.1518 0.0686 0.0693 0.0651 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3155) (0.1727) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates from the following set of equations for the 29/6/2001 – 1/8/2016 period for our eleven markets’ indices: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝜃𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜙2|𝑟𝑡−1| + 𝑡 , 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 +  𝛾 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2  
Parentheses include the p-values of the estimates. The indices comprising our sample are: EFG Index (Egypt), Amman Stock Exchange General Index (Jordan), IDX Composite 
(Indonesia), FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia), CFG 25 (Morocco), MSM 30 (Oman), KSE 100 (Pakistan), Tadawul All Share (Saudi Arabia), Tunindex (Tunisia), Borsa 





Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates of the extended Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model, controlling for Ramadan-effect 
Parameters  Egypt Indonesia Jordan Malaysia Morocco Oman Pakistan Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey UAE 
𝜔0 -0.3744 -0.2149 -0.0375 -0.0175 0.0400 0.0957 0.2217 0.0793 -0.0250 0.0642 0.1438 
 (0.0002) (0.0060) (0.4434) (0.7553) (0.5200) (0.0858) (0.0370) (0.2327) (0.5706) (0.6767) (0.0260) 
𝜔1 0.1058 0.0475 -0.0118 0.0137 -0.0011 0.0428 0.1128 0.0911 0.0016 0.1148 0.0253 
 (0.0225) (0.1362) (0.4588) (0.3975) (0.9484) (0.0043) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8776) (0.0180) (0.1519) 
𝜃0 0.2199 0.2546 0.0951 0.1317 0.0388 -0.1026 -0.1167 -0.0318 0.3359 0.0232 0.0527 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2411) (0.4019) (0.7309) (0.2843) (0.2492) (0.6111) (0.1637) (0.5303) (0.0000) 
𝜃1 -0.0156 0.0126 0.0389 0.0241 0.0263 -0.0084 -0.0179 -0.0254 0.0965 -0.0223 -0.0104 
 (0.4324) (0.5591) (0.0425) (0.5161) (0.4538) (0.7286) (0.2993) (0.0364) (0.0367) (0.1795) (0.1097) 
𝜙0,0 0.1271 0.0498 -0.0715 0.2603 0.1426 0.3036 0.3370 0.2562 -0.3400 0.0939 -0.0273 
 (0.2087) (0.6262) (0.3912) (0.0189) (0.0570) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0002) (0.1785) (0.3832) (0.8214) 
𝜙1,0 0.0225 0.0271 0.0420 -0.1842 0.0380 -0.0272 -0.1296 -0.0586 -0.3400 -0.0096 -0.0013 
 (0.1262) (0.4398) (0.3852) (0.3507) (0.4897) (0.5744) (0.0582) (0.0002) (0.1785) (0.5566) (0.0347) 
𝜙0,1 0.1754 0.1195 0.0772 0.1564 0.2004 0.2165 0.1139 0.1373 0.2797 0.0775 0.2030 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0094) (0.0000) 
𝜙1,1 -0.0066 -0.0049 -0.0156 -0.0183 -0.0433 -0.0098 -0.0053 -0.0083 -0.0609 -0.0106 -0.0052 
 (0.0427) (0.4950) (0.0000) (0.5303) (0.0040) (0.0776) (0.4566) (0.0118) (0.0026) (0.0527) (0.0008) 
𝛼 0.2779 0.0878 0.0089 0.0120 0.0582 0.0426 0.0798 0.0452 0.0188 0.0848 0.0261 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛽 0.7383 0.8264 0.9111 0.8760 0.6875 0.8046 0.7862 0.8390 0.7572 0.8897 0.8024 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛾 0.0962 0.0570 0.1181 0.0702 0.2332 0.1132 0.0947 0.0718 0.1332 0.0534 0.1744 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛿 0.1245 0.1246 -0.0530 0.0679 -0.0134 0.0702 0.1479 0.1540 0.0673 0.0693 0.0856 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4023) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1387) 
H0: 𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1 0.2173 0.4445 3.0723 0.8345 0.5408 0.6535 3.4192 2.6681 0.1732 0.0218 3.1119 
 (0.6410) (0.5049) (0.0796) (0.3609) (0.4620) (0.4188) (0.0644) (0.1023) (0.6772) (0.8825) (0.0777) 
H0: 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1 3.7485 0.8028 1.4078 0.6896 2.0634 0.1263 3.2809 9.7014 1.2061 0.0035 6.9578 
 (0.0528) (0.3702) (0.2354) (0.4062) (0.1508) (0.7222) (0.0700) (0.0018) (0.2720) (0.9527) (0.0083) 
The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates from the following set of equations for the 29/6/2001 – 1/8/2016 period for our eleven markets’ indices: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔0𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔1(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜃0𝐷𝑡𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝐷𝑡)𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝐷𝑡(𝜙0,0 + 𝜙1,0𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐷𝑡)(𝜙0,1 + 𝜙1,1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡, 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 +  𝛾 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2  
𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variableassuming the value of unity in-Ramadan, zero otherwise.Parentheses include p-values. The bottom two rows contain the chi-squared test values from testing the hypotheses 
𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1 and 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1, respectively. The indices comprising our sample are: EFG Index (Egypt), Amman Stock Exchange General Index (Jordan), IDX Composite (Indonesia), FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia), CFG 25 (Morocco), MSM 30 (Oman), KSE 100 (Pakistan), Tadawul All Share (Saudi Arabia), Tunindex (Tunisia), Borsa Istanbul 100 (Turkey) and ADX General 




Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates of the extended Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model, controlling for Ramadan-effect, pre-crisis (29/6/2001 – 9/10/2007) 
Parameters  Egypt Indonesia Jordan Malaysia Morocco Oman Pakistan Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey UAE 
𝜔0 0.2273 0.5359 0.1881 -0.1119 0.1083 -0.1485 0.6929 -0.0751 -0.0308 0.2530 0.1387 
 (0.6169) (0.4003) (0.3263) (0.3801) (0.3415) (0.8138) (0.0045) (0.6897) (0.8386) (0.4425) (0.1257) 
𝜔1 0.1576 0.0964 0.0429 0.0246 0.0283 0.0936 0.2122 0.1497 -0.0172 0.1803 0.0349 
 (0.0250) (0.1581) (0.3648) (0.4484) (0.2225) (0.1471) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4614) (0.0805) (0.0803) 
𝜃0 -0.0528 -0.3576 -0.0481 0.4216 0.0438 0.5786 -0.3398 0.0789 0.6643 -0.0031 0.0027 
 (0.8339) (0.5232) (0.8429) (0.1756) (0.8468) (0.6576) (0.0545) (0.6001) (0.0624) (0.9611) (0.9922) 
𝜃1 -0.0077 0.0041 0.0265 0.0249 0.0084 -0.0366 -0.0250 -0.0227 0.2600 -0.0235 0.0203 
 (0.8230) (0.9292) (0.4941) (0.7063) (0.8355) (0.6947) (0.3224) (0.1112) (0.0999) (0.3755) (0.4173) 
𝜙0,0 0.2222 0.0469 -0.3319 0.4053 0.2273 1.2880 0.2770 0.2025 -0.5255 0.0043 0.1080 
 (0.5378) (0.9368) (0.2920) (0.1361) (0.0810) (0.0381) (0.2224) (0.2579) (0.1367) (0.9787) (0.5938) 
𝜙1,0 -0.0063 -0.0448 0.3059 -0.4796 -0.0044 -2.0111 -0.1096 -0.0848 3.5237 0.0038 -0.0480 
 (0.9694) (0.9250) (0.1864) (0.3332) (0.9775) (0.0594) (0.2777) (0.2333) (0.1758) (0.8587) (0.8551) 
𝜙0,1 0.1889 0.1807 0.0724 0.1926 0.3344 0.1407 0.0105 0.1044 0.1425 0.1423 0.2433 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1864) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0209) (0.8172) (0.0045) (0.0085) (0.0077) (0.0000) 
𝜙1,1 -0.0149 -0.0148 -0.0284 -0.0294 -0.0552 -0.0385 -0.0009 -0.0068 0.4592 -0.0181 -0.0209 
 (0.1690) (0.3218) (0.1802) (0.5133) (0.0074) (0.1476) (0.9258) (0.0882) (0.0235) (0.0271) (0.0720) 
𝛼 0.1845 0.2734 0.0172 0.0195 0.0770 0.0284 0.1607 0.0486 0.0113 0.1041 0.0209 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1690) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛽 0.7887 0.6800 0.9428 0.8654 0.5855 0.9296 0.7502 0.8194 0.8128 0.9000 0.8210 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛾 0.1318 0.0180 0.0590 0.0706 0.4330 0.0451 0.1157 0.1270 0.1293 0.0606 0.1928 
 (0.0000) (0.3275) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0803) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛿 0.0051 0.2575 -0.0265 0.0606 -0.1682 -0.0505 0.1231 0.0998 -0.0229 0.0364 -0.0270 
 (0.7943) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0200) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2488) (0.0100) (0.1008) 
H0: 𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1 0.0083 0.5214 1.6063 1.7983 0.6476 3.6780 2.5659 0.2878 3.5141 0.6321 0.4322 
 (0.9270) (0.4702) (0.2050) (0.1799) (0.4209) (0.0551) (0.1091) (0.5916) (0.0608) (0.4265) (0.5108) 
H0: 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1 0.0026 0.0478 2.0711 4.2747 0.1006 3.5097 3.1126 1.1977 1.3824 0.9122 0.0106 
 (0.9591) (0.8268) (0.1501) (0.0386) (0.7510) (0.0610) (0.0776) (0.2737) (0.2396) (0.3395) (0.9179) 
The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates from the following set of equations for the 29/6/2001 – 9/10/2007 period for our eleven markets’ indices: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔0𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔1(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜃0𝐷𝑡𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝐷𝑡)𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝐷𝑡(𝜙0,0 + 𝜙1,0𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐷𝑡)(𝜙0,1 + 𝜙1,1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡, 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 +  𝛾 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2  
𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variableassuming the value of unity in-Ramadan, zero otherwise.Parentheses include p-values. The bottom two rows contain the chi-squared test values from testing the hypotheses 
𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1 and 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1, respectively. The indices comprising our sample are: EFG Index (Egypt), Amman Stock Exchange General Index (Jordan), IDX Composite (Indonesia), FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia), CFG 25 (Morocco), MSM 30 (Oman), KSE 100 (Pakistan), Tadawul All Share (Saudi Arabia), Tunindex (Tunisia), Borsa Istanbul 100 (Turkey) and ADX General 






Table 7: Maximum likelihood estimates of the extended Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model, controlling for Ramadan-effect (10/10/2007 – 1/8/2016) 
Parameters Egypt Indonesia Jordan Malaysia Morocco Oman Pakistan Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey UAE 
𝜔0 -0.4711 -0.1146 0.0013 0.0099 -0.0649 0.0476 0.1070 0.0520 -0.0319 -0.0409 -0.0260 
 (0.0003) (0.2458) (0.9803) (0.8874) (0.4620) (0.1970) (0.3894) (0.4103) (0.6116) (0.8358) (0.5476) 
𝜔1 0.0144 0.0160 -0.0245 0.0077 -0.0452 -0.0042 0.0817 0.0600 0.0071 0.1042 0.0538 
 (0.8177) (0.6371) (0.1611) (0.6809) (0.1057) (0.7576) (0.0029) (0.0225) (0.6290) (0.0761) (0.0374) 
𝜃0 0.2168 0.1853 -0.0107 0.0233 0.1717 -0.0382 -0.0732 0.0076 0.1787 0.0414 0.2062 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9365) (0.9169) (0.3648) (0.6826) (0.5867) (0.9030) (0.5348) (0.5758) (0.0000) 
𝜃1 0.0000 0.0111 0.0274 0.0198 0.0748 -0.0078 -0.0217 -0.0355 0.0536 -0.0336 -0.0546 
 (0.9971) (0.6411) (0.1114) (0.6724) (0.2441) (0.7379) (0.4249) (0.0647) (0.3063) (0.1779) (0.0240) 
𝜙0,0 0.1955 0.0792 -0.0296 0.2242 0.0101 0.3285 -0.3126 0.3066 0.5437 0.1632 -0.0631 
 (0.1368) (0.5644) (0.7575) (0.1136) (0.9246) (0.0032) (0.0562) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.2838) (0.1941) 
𝜙1,0 -0.0152 0.0089 0.0016 -0.1219 -0.1415 -0.0395 -0.1302 -0.0462 -0.6294 -0.0239 0.0110 
 (0.5186) (0.8441) (0.9807) (0.6556) (0.1070) (0.3714) (0.2952) (0.0893) (0.0692) (0.4136) (0.0000) 
𝜙0,1 0.1766 0.0428 0.0958 0.1330 0.1108 0.3237 0.1710 0.1498 0.2896 0.0517 0.1650 
 (0.0000) (0.1721) (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0025) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1832) (0.0000) 
𝜙1,1 -0.0024 0.0055 -0.0060 -0.0154 -0.0185 -0.0131 0.0025 -0.0078 -0.0694 -0.0090 -0.0072 
 (0.6291) (0.5254) (0.0000) 0.7029 (0.6361) (0.0162) (0.8302) (0.1731) (0.0000) (0.3376) (0.3775) 
𝛼 0.2943 0.0304 0.0418 0.0112 0.0421 0.0165 0.0624 0.0365 0.0276 0.1174 0.0509 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0033) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛽 0.7473 0.8976 0.7109 0.8709 0.7775 0.7766 0.7900 0.8583 0.7161 0.8663 0.8504 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛾 0.0488 0.0403 0.3046 0.0638 0.1014 0.1667 0.0467 0.0252 0.1314 0.0315 -0.0182 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0139) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0000) 
𝛿 0.1953 0.0849 -0.0623 0.0911 0.0749 0.1321 0.2339 0.2094 0.1297 0.1170 0.2798 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4178) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
H0: 𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1 0.0197 0.0667 1.2979 0.3920 0.7942 0.0018 0.7248 3.4314 3.1478 0.5115 18.5118 
 (0.8883) (0.7962) (0.2546) (0.5312) (0.3728) (0.9664) (0.3946) (0.0640) (0.0760) (0.4745) (0.0000) 
H0: 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1 0.2840 0.0055 0.0130 0.1486 2.6908 0.3525 1.1324 1.9158 2.6069 0.2397 4.9337 
 (0.5941) (0.9409) (0.9094) (0.6999) (0.1009) (0.5528) (0.2873) (0.1663) (0.0000) (0.6244) (0.0263) 
The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates from the following set of equations for the 10/10/2007 – 1/8/2016 period for our eleven markets’ indices: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔0𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔1(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜃0𝐷𝑡𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝐷𝑡)𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝐷𝑡(𝜙0,0 + 𝜙1,0𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐷𝑡)(𝜙0,1 + 𝜙1,1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡, 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 +  𝛾 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2  
𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variableassuming the value of unity in-Ramadan, zero otherwise.Parentheses include p-values. The bottom two rows contain the chi-squared test values from testing the hypotheses 
𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1 and 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1, respectively. The indices comprising our sample are: EFG Index (Egypt), Amman Stock Exchange General Index (Jordan), IDX Composite (Indonesia), FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia), CFG 25 (Morocco), MSM 30 (Oman), KSE 100 (Pakistan), Tadawul All Share (Saudi Arabia), Tunindex (Tunisia), Borsa Istanbul 100 (Turkey) and ADX General 
Index (United Arab Emirates). 
 
  
Table 8: Maximum likelihood estimates of the extended Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model, controlling for Ramadan-effect, post crisis (7/3/2009 – 1/8/2016) 
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Parameters Egypt Indonesia Jordan Malaysia Morocco Oman Pakistan Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey UAE 
𝜔0 -0.0072 0.0460 -0.0469 -0.0281 -0.1034 0.0397 0.1528 0.1304 -0.0127 0.0929 0.1109 
 (0.9845) (0.7472) (0.4826) (0.7710) (0.6079) (0.5374) (0.1937) (0.2666) (0.8676) (0.7367) (0.2408) 
𝜔1 -0.0250 -0.0208 -0.0335 -0.0371 -0.0676 -0.0104 0.0695 0.0459 -0.0060 0.1410 0.0022 
 (0.7497) (0.5985) (0.1549) (0.1433) (0.1090) (0.4670) (0.0361) (0.1213) (0.7084) (0.1218) (0.9311) 
𝜃0 0.0048 0.0290 0.1328 0.2513 0.3185 0.0395 -0.0790 -0.0963 0.0650 -0.0305 0.0594 
 (0.9802) (0.8250) (0.3535) (0.4886) (0.5738) (0.9019) (0.5562) (0.5965) (0.8875) (0.8154) (0.6365) 
𝜃1 0.0255 0.0776 0.0340 0.2069 0.1532 0.0151 0.0093 -0.0187 0.1101 -0.0388 0.0064 
 (0.4454) (0.0277) (0.3610) (0.0114) (0.1773) (0.6877) (0.8209) (0.4983) (0.0811) (0.4038) (0.8445) 
𝜙0,0 0.2451 0.0927 -0.1962 0.1066 0.1244 0.2665 0.2982 0.2940 0.5001 0.1439 0.1292 
 (0.2601) (0.5814) (0.2676) (0.5943) (0.6785) (0.1778) (0.0636) (0.1807) (0.0003) (0.4403) (0.4171) 
𝜙1,0 -0.0486 -0.0165 0.1228 0.2759 -0.1455 0.1303 -0.1293 -0.0608 -0.5618 -0.0242 -0.1220 
 (0.5078) (0.8282) (0.2632) (0.6002) (0.8110) (0.8029) (0.3053) (0.8198) (0.2162) (0.5851) (0.4506) 
𝜙0,1 0.1893 0.0549 0.0432 0.1252 0.1678 0.3320 0.2422 0.1443 0.2900 0.0839 0.1675 
 (0.0001) (0.2005) (0.1912) (0.0047) (0.0011) 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2001) (0.0000) 
𝜙1,1 -0.0093 -0.0084 -0.0058 -0.0250 -0.1348 -0.0393 -0.0774 -0.0162 -0.0525 -0.0277 -0.0154 
 (0.4226) (0.6798) (0.0001) (0.7758) (0.0774) (0.0111) (0.0027) (0.0738) (0.0188) (0.2511) (0.2241) 
𝛼 0.3124 0.0410 0.0876 0.0126 0.0551 0.0238 0.0531 0.0449 0.0277 0.1520 0.0245 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0183) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛽 0.7429 0.8678 0.5397 0.8798 0.7458 0.7167 0.7943 0.8442 0.6957 0.8494 0.8509 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
𝛾 0.0601 0.0716 0.4185 0.0496 0.0905 0.1590 0.0539 0.0204 0.1259 0.0333 0.0755 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0913) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0000) 
𝛿 0.1512 0.0583 -0.1450 0.0641 0.0558 0.1781 0.2055 0.2106 0.1620 0.0951 0.1222 
 (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.4656) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) ((0.000) (0.0000) 
H0: 𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1 0.0624 0.0477 1.9534 0.0082 0.0202 0.1075 0.1154 0.4548 2.2033 0.0926 0.0559 
 (0.8026) (0.8270) (0.1622) (0.9277) (0.8868) (0.7429) (0.7341) (0.5000) (0.1377) (0.7607) (0.8129) 
H0: 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1 0.2792 0.0104 1.3749 0.3179 0.0003 0.1054 0.1635 0.0277 1.2549 0.0045 0.4315 
 (0.5971) (0.9186) (0.2409) (0.5728) (0.9860) (0.7454) (0.6860) (0.8676) (0.2626) (0.9461) (0.5112) 
The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates from the following set of equations for the 7/3/2009 – 1/8/2016 period for our eleven markets’ indices: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜔0𝐷𝑡 + 𝜔1(1 − 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜃0𝐷𝑡𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝐷𝑡)𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝐷𝑡(𝜙0,0 + 𝜙1,0𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝐷𝑡)(𝜙0,1 + 𝜙1,1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡 , 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 +  𝛾 𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿𝐼𝑡−1 𝑡−1
2  
𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable assuming the value of unity in-Ramadan, zero otherwise.Parentheses include p-values. The bottom two rows contain the chi-squared test values from testing 
the hypotheses 𝜙0,0 =  𝜙0,1  and 𝜙1,0 =  𝜙1,1 , respectively. The indices comprising our sample are: EFG Index (Egypt), Amman Stock Exchange General Index (Jordan), IDX 
Composite (Indonesia), FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI (Malaysia), CFG 25 (Morocco), MSM 30 (Oman), KSE 100 (Pakistan), Tadawul All Share (Saudi Arabia), Tunindex (Tunisia), 
Borsa Istanbul 100 (Turkey) and ADX General Index (United Arab Emirates). 
 
